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Fuel for Conspiracy:
Suspected Imperialist
Plots and the Chaco War
Luis Roniger1 and Leonardo Senkman2
Abstract
Conspiracy discourse interprets the world as the object of sinister machinations, rife
with opaque plots and covert actors. With this frame, the war between Bolivia and
Paraguay over the Northern Chaco region (1932–1935) emerges as a paradigmatic
conflict that many in the Americas interpreted as resulting from the conspiracy man-
oeuvres of foreign oil interests to grab land supposedly rich in oil. At the heart of such
interpretation, projected by those critical of the fratricidal war, were partial and
extrapolated facts, which sidelined the weight of long-term disputes between these
South American countries traumatised by previous international wars resulting in
humiliating defeats and territorial losses, and thus prone to welcome warfare to bolster
national pride and overcome the memory of past debacles. The article reconstructs the
transnational diffusion of the conspiracy narrative that tilted political and intellectual
imagination towards attributing the war to imperialist economic interests, downplaying
the political agency of those involved. Analysis suggests that such transnational reception
highlights a broader trend in the twentieth-century Latin American conspiracy discourse,
stemming from the theorization of geopolitical marginality and the belief that political
decision-making was shaped by the plots of hegemonic powers.
Resumen
Todo discurso conspirativo interpreta el mundo como sujeto a maquinaciones siniestras
tramadas tras bambalinas. Desde esa perspectiva, la guerra entre Bolivia y Paraguay
1 Department of Politics and International Studies, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC, USA
2 Harry S Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, Hebrew University, Mount Scopus,
Jerusalem, Israel
Corresponding author:
Luis Roniger, Department of Politics and International Studies, Wake Forest University, Kirby Hall 314A, PO
Box 7568, Winston-Salem, NC 27109, USA.
Email: ronigerl@wfu.edu
Journal of Politics in Latin America
2019, Vol. 11(1) 3–22
ª The Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/1866802X19843008
journals.sagepub.com/home/pla
j Journal of Politics inLatin America
Creative Commons Non Commercial CC BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 License (http://www.creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work
without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages
(https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).
sobre el Chaco Boreal (1932–1935) es paradigmática de un conflicto que muchos en
América Latina interpretaron como resultado de las maniobras conspirativas de inter-
eses petroleros extranjeros que intentaban apoderarse de tierras supuestamente ricas
en petróleo. Tal interpretación, proyectada por quienes lamentaron la guerra fratricida,
se basó en hechos parciales y extrapolados, que ignoraron el peso de disputas de larga
traza entre esos dos estados traumatizados por guerras internacionales anteriores que
habı́an resultado en derrotas humillantes y pérdidas territoriales, y que, por lo tanto,
eran propensos a lanzarse a una nueva guerra que podrı́a reparar el mellado orgullo
nacional y superar la memoria de debacles pasados. El artı́culo reconstruye la difusión de
la narrativa conspirativa que atribuyó la guerra a los intereses económicos imperialistas,
minimizando el rol y la agencia polı́tica de las partes beligerantes; y sugiere que tal
recepción transnacional refleja una tendencia más amplia en el discurso conspirativo
latinoamericano del siglo XX, tendencia derivada de teorizar la marginalidad geopolı́tica
de la región y asumir que la toma de decisiones polı́ticas ha sido producto de complots
originados en los poderes hegemónicos globales.
Keywords
Conspiracy theories, international wars, historical trauma, transnational diffusion,
collective memory
Palabras clave
Teorı́as conspirativas, guerras internacionales, traumas históricos, difusión transnacional,
memoria colectiva
Conspiracy discourse interprets the world as the object of sinister machinations, rife with
opaque plots and covert actors. Those who adopt a conspiracy worldview usually assume
the existence of a disguised historical causality operated by sinister social forces and
nefarious underground powers. They consider that internal and external enemies,
including foreign powers and economic interests, secretly plot projects of domination or
destruction. As “truth seekers,” they consider it a moral duty to unmask these plots, defy
those malevolent forces, and thus safeguard the integrity of a collectivity, its spirit, and
material resources (see among others the classic approaches by Hofstadter, 1963; Pop-
per, 1963: 24–29, and later contributions by Al-Azm, 2011; Di Maggio, 2017; Eco, 2016;
Fenster, 1999; González, 2004; McCaffrey, 2012; Piglia, 2007).
Conspiracy theories found fertile ground for their development under certain con-
ditions. Latin American countries could not ignore being positioned at the periphery and
semi-periphery of the world system, subject to the variable impact of geopolitical and
economic forces beyond their control. Most elites were traditionally biased into adopting
Western worldviews, both religious and secular, that predicated a continuous concern
with development, while being at the margins of modernity (Eisenstadt, 1998; Roniger
and Waisman, 2002; Whitehead, 2006). In politics and public life, repeatedly, con-
spiracy plots throughout the region aimed at removing power-holders or defeating
opposition forces, some of which were successful (see e.g. Guerrero and Vale, 2012;
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Santos Molano, 2011). As many heads of government were deposed, sent to prison, or
forced into exile (Sznajder and Roniger, 2009), political actors in Central and South
America developed a “sixth sense” about suspected intrigues, investing energies in
finding out who could be plotting against them and the national interest, both domes-
tically and at the international arena (Kelman, 2012; Pérez and Antonio, 2008).
More punctually, challenging events causing social anxiety, such as situations of war,
institutional breakdown, or cultural fracture, may prompt conspiratorial thought. Faced
with the disorientation that is generated, those who share a conspiratorial stance suggest
the certainty that, once the forces of evil are unmasked and their designs are exposed, it
will be possible to make sense of the crisis and move to defeat the internal and/or
external enemies. Incorporating fragmented pieces of information and claiming their
veracity as proof of subterranean plots planned by malevolent forces, these theories have
been used both to delegitimise opposition forces as well as convince populations of the
evil machinations of powerful interests or of the lack of awareness to an impending
disaster requiring immediate action (Graf et al., 2011; Piglia, 2007). The lack of trust in
institutions, in the authorities, the media, and even in science has added functionality to
the mentality that explained in conspiracy terms the ineffectiveness and impotence of
institutional frameworks to protect society and promote its well-being (see Barkun,
2003; Brotherton, 2015; Hofstadter, 1963; Parish, 2001; Pérez and Antonio, 2008).
From a decades-long perspective, the war between Bolivia and Paraguay over the
Northern Chaco region (1932–1935) emerges as a paradigmatic case of a conflict that
many in Latin America – and beyond – interpreted as resulting from the conspiracy
manoeuvres of foreign oil interests. Without doubt, economic factors played a funda-
mental role in the outbreak of the war, the major war between South American nations in
the twentieth century. Yet, what merits exploration at the centre of this article is how
popular and intellectual imagination tilted towards attributing the war to a conspiracy
driven by imperialist economic interests, downplaying the political agency of those
involved throughout the region. This also implies understanding how such conspiracy
narrative was swiftly and widely accredited as truthful, being ultimately diffused for
decades on a transnational scale.
This article aims to decode the conspiracy theories built around the Chaco War,
tracing their transference and reception, mainly through South American sources from
Bolivia, Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil. After describing the issues at stake in the war
and the widespread reception of a conspiratorial narrative attributing the war to foreign
oil interests, the article reconstructs how the conception of the “War of the Standard Oil”
developed transnationally, including beyond the boundaries of the nations at war. The
conclusion suggests the dangers of relying on conspiracy discourse and theorization to
claim victimhood, flattening historical complexities, and depleting actual decision
makers of agency over the destinies of their society. While defeat in war and policy
failure, along with a sense of geopolitical marginality, may explain why conspiracy
theories have been so attractive in some international constellations – such as the case
under analysis here – those tendencies may be detrimental to societies in need of a
truthful assessment over long-lasting territorial disputes and historical claims.
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The Chaco War: Historical Animosities and Collective Traumas
In 1932–1935, Bolivia and Paraguay waged a dreadful war, with over 80,000 soldiers
succumbing to bullets, thirst, malaria, and other diseases, as well as dozens of thousands
more wounded or taken prisoners. For Paraguay, the outcome was a stimulating victory,
an energizing push away from catastrophic defeat in the War of the Triple Alliance,
another war fought in 1864–1870 against Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Contrastingly,
for Bolivia, the bloody defeat in the Chaco War continued the process of territorial loss
that begun with the Pacific War against Chile (1879–1883) and the cession of territory to
Brazil in 1867 and 1903.
In Bolivia, the impact was also profound, if otherwise, as the war took thousands of
indigenous inhabitants from the highlands to the subtropical front, allowing them as well
as the young conscripts from the cities to get to know each other and glimpse the
character and problems of Bolivian society. Accordingly, the war was a catalyst for new
processes, as it generated unease in both civilian and military circles, increasing popular
bitterness towards the ruling elites and the inefficient and corrupt high command of the
army. According to historian Herbert Klein, “the veterans who survived the Chaco would
become the ferment from which a new political order would emerge in Bolivia”
(Alexander, 1962: 199; Klein, 1993: 223). Indeed, the general disenchantment with the
outcome of the war generated reformist trends among army officers and led to the rise of
the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR), resulting years later in the 1952
Bolivian Revolution.
The outbreak of the war was fundamentally fuelled by unresolved border disputes
between the belligerents and historical dreams of renewed national grandeur. The con-
frontation between Bolivia and Paraguay started decades earlier, due to the lack of
certainty about which right of colonial boundaries (uti possidetis) should prevail to set
the border. Bolivia claimed rights over the territory that extended to the river Paraguay
and the river Pilcomayo, based on titles of the Audiencia of Charcas, while Paraguay
claimed rights based on ordinances of the Spanish Crown, dating back to sixteenth-
century Capitulaciones and the Ordinances of the Intendance of 1782, sustained by
their continued territorial possession even after 1810. Paraguayan politician and his-
torian Efraı́m Cardozo offered the following appreciation of the situation on the eve of
the war:
Discrepancies were fundamental. The two countries did not even agree on what was the
subject of the litigation. According to Bolivia, it was mainly about the Chaco [in its
entirety], yet according to Paraguay, only about its limits. But as things were in 1932, the
problem was no longer a confrontation over territorial entitlements, but of contrasting
policies phrased in terms not reducible to legal solutions. (Cardozo, 1965: 134)
From the 1880s to the 1920s, both countries held futile negotiations over the sover-
eignty of that territory. For Paraguay, the Pinilla-Soler protocol of 1907 – which had
divided the Chaco between a Paraguayan zone and another to be arbitrated by Argentina,
was considered binding. But while Paraguay ratified it, Bolivia delayed its acceptance
until rejecting it in 1910, ignoring the status quo line and placing pillboxes in it to stop
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any Paraguayan advance, be it for cattle grazing, quebracho extraction, or settlement by
Mennonites. In the 1920s, nationalist fervour had spread in both countries, impeding
diplomatic talks about the Chaco. Attempts at arbitration by the International Conference
of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration and by Argentina, the United States,
and the League of Nations did not produce any results, thus giving rise to the bloody
confrontation (Mora and Cooney, 2007: 66–77).
The weight of collective historical trauma was all the time at work underneath the
surface. As C. William Walldorf indicates while developing hindsight from Neil Smelser
(1962) and Jeffrey Alexander et al. (2004),
master narratives emerge from a nation’s experience of cultural trauma, the scars of which
leave a lasting and powerful mark on collective thinking. [ . . . ] Events causing identity
pain do far more than simply create space or a tabula rasa for a broader discussion among
different groups. They also give specific content to the space in which agents operate and
build stories. More specifically, events tilt the playing field, or bias the political oppor-
tunity structure, to privilege stories from some carrier groups more than others. (Walldorf,
2019: 5, 20)
Bolivia had, as President Salamanca stated, “a history of international disasters that we
must counteract with a victorious war.” The trauma of the War of the Pacific, in which
Bolivia lost its Antofagasta province, left profound scars in the collective memory of the
country. After having been cut off from the Pacific five decades earlier, Salamanca
trusted that a war over Chaco would open a fluvial way out to the sea, this time towards
the Rı́o de la Plata and the Atlantic Ocean, restoring national pride. Paraguayans had
their own historical collective trauma to wrangle with. Having lost much of their territory
and population in the disastrous War of the Triple Alliance, they would fiercely resist
removal from the Chaco. For them, the area constituted more than half of their remaining
national territory and an important base of their economy, over which the United States
had recognised Paraguayan rule. Affected by heavy collective trauma, both countries
engaged in ferocious attacks and counter-attacks with no definitive results. Only between
June and July 1935, through the mediation of representatives of a group of American
countries, a ceasefire was agreed, ending the hostilities based on the positions the
belligerent countries had reached and on a peace conference that, by direct agreement
or arbitration, was expected to end the litigation that led to the war.
Since the outbreak of the war, various explanations were advanced trying to make
sense of it. One interpretation shared by many, especially on the Left, was that the war
had been the product of a conspiracy laid out by big foreign oil corporations and their
allies in the Bolivian oligarchy and government. According to that interpretation, the war
had been an “imperialist adventure,” a “War of the Standard Oil” against the Royal
Dutch Shell operating in Paraguay. While the war was ongoing, the Bolivian communist
leader exiled in Argentina, Tristán Marof, expressed this conspiracy in his book La
tragedia del altiplano:
Why was Bolivia fighting in the Chaco? For the national honor as avowed in the manifesto
of the intellectuals of July 30, 1932? No. Bolivia fought to obtain a port and to defend the
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four million hectares of domain against the interests of the English Royal Dutch Shell.
(Marof, 1934: 206)
Similarly, in neighbouring Paraguay, Carlos R. Santos published a short book of
essays and documents on the imminent Paraguayan-Bolivian conflict, suggesting that
the Standard Oil Company
had verified the existence of very rich deposits in Bolivia, near the Chaco, and reached the
conviction that it [the Chaco] also had them [such rich reservoirs]. Standard Oil realized that
delivering the product by pipelines through the Pacific would involve unreturned expenses
due to the crossing of the Cordillera and considered more practical the exploitation via the
Paraguay River. This criterion encouraged Bolivia to launch its senseless campaign against
our Chaco territory. [ . . . ] Very few can ignore, equally, that Bolivia is considered practi-
cally a factory of that opulent company [ . . . ] (Santos, 1932: 17, 29)
Marof’s analysis was more sophisticated, even if still putting onus on the Standard Oil
pressures. According to him, on the Bolivian side, the war had been the result of an
oligarchic power structure allied to Western capitals:
[the war was the work of] half dozen Bolivians who have it all: millions, servants, the
fatherland. And that’s why they trample on the republic, they guide the massacre and enrich
themselves even more, being allies of the American and British capitalists [ . . . ] With the
Bolivian economy in ruins [ . . . ] the only way out for [president Daniel] Salamanca’s
government was the war in the Chaco, [where] a powerful company, owning more than
four and a half millions of oil fields, pressed for that purpose. [ . . . ] The dreamed victory
over Paraguay and the access to a port on the river of the same name on behalf of the
Standard Oil and with the sacrifice of Bolivian weapons was the only possibility that men in
the Bolivian government, that is the feudal lords allied to foreign imperialism, had to
subsist, thriving and continue dominating over their servants [the citizens of Bolivia].
(Marof, 1934: 2–3).
Marof was forthright: “This is what Salamanca and his clique wanted, smelling the oil
and ready to deliver Bolivia, unhindered, definitely to the Yankees, in an alliance to the
neck for their loans and investments.” According to him, if Bolivia had won the war, then
the social question would have been completely diverted. Workers would have been
dominated, a military dictatorship would have been established, and the aspirations of
the masses would have been restrained, “forcing them by force and a paltry salary, to the
rough work of the mines and oil wells, under the whip of the foreign foreman, owner of
the wealth” (Marof, 1934: 3).
Such an analysis of the Bolivian political–economic elite known as “la rosca,” which
was conducted from exile by the leader of the Túpac Amaru organization, would be
transformed into something slightly different due to the ideological Trotskyist bend of
the Fourth International; namely, a conspiracy theory according to which the oil com-
panies provoked the fratricidal confrontation of Bolivia with Paraguay:
On July 31, 1932, the armies of Bolivia and Paraguay began a war pulled by the Yankee oil
company Standard Oil and the Anglo-Dutch Shell. It lasted three years, with between 90 and
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150 thousand fallen combatants and both peoples bleeding to death. Oil was never found in
that region. (Fourth International, 2017)
Many Latin Americans echoed the conspiratorial view, according to which the Stan-
dard Oil Company manoeuvred the Bolivian government into going to war. Thus, in his
analysis of British policy in the Rı́o de la Plata, Argentine nationalist essayist Raúl
Scalabrini Ortiz echoed that argument about the genesis of the Chaco War:
On the other side are the reckless, aggressive and insolent US capitals of the Standard Oil
and General Motors, to whom we owe September 6 [9-6-1930, the date of the military coup
d’état of General José Félix Uriburu in Argentina], the fratricidal Chaco War [our empha-
sis], a separatist trend in the Province of Salta, and the shameful oil law currently in force.
(Scalabrini Ortiz, 2001 [1940]: 138)
The long-lasting impact of such conspiracy interpretation could be traced for
decades in the works and writings of respected Latin American intellectuals and
political activists. Illustrative are the statements by Argentine investigative journalist
Gregorio Selser and Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano, who replicated such inter-
pretation as late as the 1980s–1990s. In his book Cronologı́a de las intervenciones
extranjeras en América Latina 1899–1945, Gregorio Selser registered the date of 31
July 1932, as follows:
the War of El Chaco begins between Paraguay and Bolivia, lashed respectively by England
and the United States or, what is the same, by the oil companies Shell and Standard Oil.
(Selser, 2001 [1994]: 539)
Likewise, while describing with acuteness the suffering of those who were the cannon
fodder of a ruthless war, Eduardo Galeano insinuated in Memoria del fuego that the
interests of the foreign oil corporations were behind the war:
Bolivia and Paraguay are at war. The two poorest peoples of South America, those who have
no sea, the most defeated and dispossessed, annihilate each other by a piece of the map.
Hidden between the folds of both flags stand the Standard Oil Company and the Royal
Dutch Shell, which dispute the possible oil of the Chaco [our emphasis]. Embedded in war,
Paraguayans and Bolivians are bound to hate each other in the name of a land they do not
love, that nobody loves. Chaco is a gray desert, inhabited by thorns and snakes, without a
songbird or a people’s footprint. Everything is thirsty in this world of terror. The butterflies
huddle, desperate, over a few drops of water. The Bolivians arrive from the fridge to the
oven: they have been uprooted from the peaks of the Andes and thrown into these scorched
bushes. Here they die of bullets, but more die of thirst. Clouds of flies and mosquitoes chase
the soldiers, who duck their heads and jog through the tangle, in forced marches, against the
enemy lines. On one side and on the other, the barefoot people are the cannon fodder that
pays the errors of their officers. The slaves of the feudal patron and the rural priest die in
uniform, at the service of imperial greed. (Galeano, 1986: 94)
These quotes reflect the widespread belief of many intellectuals and political actors
throughout Latin America that the machinations of the oil companies, which they
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denounced, were behind the impulsive and ineffective war that would cost Bolivia part
of that subequatorial desert zone known as Chaco Boreal, that is, the Northern Chaco.
Countering the Narrative of “the War of the Standard Oil”
Given the superiority of the Bolivian army at the beginning of the confrontation and the
nationalist discourse of President Salamanca, the outcome of the war came as a
devastating surprise to those who intended to expand the Bolivian territorial hold and
recover national pride. That national pride had been nicked historically after losing an
exit to the sea in the War of the Pacific (1879–1883), in addition to territories ceded to
Brazil in 1867 and 1903. The debacle required a review of consciousness, which con-
tributed to the rise of conspiracy theories, a “weapon” of the weak as they tried to make
sense of history. Relying on partial facts, which were extrapolated and given aggrandised
significance, a “mythology of the war for oil” (to use historian Herbert Klein’s term) was
shaped and given credence as a means of coming to terms with the national tragedy, now
interwoven in a narrative of imperialist conspiracy.
While many unsubstantiated arguments in Bolivia and across Latin America attempt
to spread the thesis that the antagonistic interests of foreign oil corporations motivated
the Chaco War, professional historians discarded its veracity. Even nationalist historians
who were militants of the Bolivian MNR recognised the complexity of the political and
economic interests that led to the war and then to the military-civilian revolution of 1943.
Thus, Manuel Frontaura Argandoña attributed the origin of the confrontation to the push
forged by the competitive interests of the plutocracy of the tin barons and much less to
the struggle between Shell and Standard Oil, although of course countries such as
Argentina and Chile were also involved. This is how Frontaura Argandoña con-
ceptualised the genesis of the war:
The War of the Chaco (1928–1935) [was] unleashed by the mercantile interests of the
European-Argentine concessionaires in the Chaco and by nascent Latin American imperi-
alisms. Its consequence: the military-civilian revolution of 1943 [ . . . ] In the drama of the
Chaco, Salamanca was just an opaque character, an instrument of destiny. The conductors
were Spruille Braden on the one hand and Carlos Saavedra Lamas on the other. The super-
state kept silence and limited itself to making the most of it, avoiding taxes and making
expensive the favors bestowed. In Paris Patiño told Don Ezequiel Romecı́n: ‘I shall remain
poor, but we will win the war’. He came out richer as Bolivia lost the war and the peace.
Hochschild took over the line of Villazón-Atocha to speculate and by means of a skillful
operation of false accounting, he charged the State double passage for the contingents of
soldiers that marched to Chaco. (Frontaura Argandoña, 2012 [1974]: 18)
Frontaura Argandoña’s analysis left no doubt about the distance between the histor-
ical evaluation of a nationalist who recognised that Bolivia had been affected by forces
detrimental to the collective interest, on the one hand, and on the other, the simplistic
conspiracy theory of a hypothetical “War of the Standard Oil.” Let us cite him at large:
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That’s how the stupid war started. Broad, serious and dark is the theme of the Chaco War.
To begin with, Salamanca is not the principal factor. He may be the saddest and most
dramatic protagonist, but in the light of historical research, he is not the author of the war.
[ . . . ] Bolivia is an underdeveloped and poor country, a country that produces high-quality
raw materials, and is thus subject to pressures and the game of outside interests, often
arriving from afar like the simoun or the tornado [ . . . ] Because of international intrigues,
Bolivia has been in conflict since 1879, especially when its demands to have access to the
sea increased. As a result, Bolivia has been clashing with Brazil, Peru, Argentina and
finally Paraguay, being the complot so effective, that, as expected, Bolivia has always been
on the losing side [our emphasis]. In the case of the Chaco War, as the Paraguayan people,
especially diplomat Rivarola, have scandalously revealed, the intervention of Chile and
Argentina in favor of Paraguay has been shameless. How could Bolivia defend itself against
so many aggressors? It is remarkable, by contrast, the amazing resistance of the Bolivian
people, the sacrifice of its military cadres and the defense of its economy through skillful
financial operations, thanks to Salamanca. Perhaps in another constellation of power, not
the one of Salamanca, a mystic of honesty, Bolivia would have been involved in a financial
catastrophe, because a war, especially when it is improvised as was that of the Chaco, lends
itself to economic inequities, but that abuse was not fashionable then. Finally, the Chaco
was not an oil war, at least not for Bolivia, because the apparently contending English and
American companies just agreed on doing harm to Bolivia [our emphasis]. The pressure
groups, assisted by political leaders and operetta diplomats, handled not only politics but
also the press, which as a great power was assigned the task of stirring up the almost naive
nationalism of the two peoples, receiving money from the two governments. A review of the
press reveals it was bloodthirsty and cruel. Both financial and political groups armed a
laborious and good country as is Paraguay. They advised it militarily and financially. They
gave it assurance of victory, a autrance as one says. For those ferocious groups, the
victimization of one hundred thousand men meant nothing. The main thing was the riveting
of their interests. The war had to happen anyway. The methodical advance of Bolivia in the
Chaco forced it. The foreign aggression – I do not say Paraguayan – would have happened
anyway. (Frontaura Argandoña, 2012 [1974]: 18 and 38)
In a detailed history of his country, Bolivian writer and historian Porfirio Dı́az
Machicao indicated clearly how a context of partisanship and economic crisis of the
landlocked country led to the conclusion that occupying Chaco would allow a way out of
territorial confinement and trigger a certain bonanza; how, as of 1931 and perhaps even
earlier, there were Bolivian plans of moving ahead and conquering Chaco, prompted by
the fear that Paraguayans would take possession of that territory; how clashes between
the patrols of both countries were interpreted as challenging “Bolivian dignity and
decorum”; how tactical thought prevailed over strategic thinking; and how divergences
of opinion and tensions between the executive branch and the General Staff of the Army
affected the entire development and outcome of the War (Dı́az Machicao, 1955, esp. 38–
39, 57–58, and 83–85).
Dı́az Machicao cites the evaluation of Demetrio Canelas, Minister of Finance in
president Salamanca’s administration, on the Northern Chaco and its role in shaping the
decisions of those willing to wage war for its possession:
Roniger and Senkman 11
When [Salamanca] ascended to the presidency, the Chaco issue was already, for several
years, a mine loaded with highly explosive materials, ready to explode at any unpremedi-
tated accident. Repeated diplomatic efforts by most influential international mediations,
such as those that came into play in Buenos Aires and Washington, had shown the irre-
concilable divergence between the pretensions of one state or the other, as each contender
was being fed in their positions by an ardent propaganda, which not only jeopardized the
rights and interests of both nations, but also their feelings of honor and self-esteem. [ . . . ]
Strange destiny of this mysterious Northern Chaco, that has never offered the goods that
make land possession desirable yet seems to have had the mission of testing the vitality of
two peoples and their right to persist over time. (Dı́az Machicao, 1955: 57)
In a recent work, Argentine researcher Maximilano Zuccarino sums up the state of the
art reassessing the thesis of the oil industry pushing for war, as he stresses its wide
reception despite the feeble historical ground. Zuccarino suggests a more reliable appre-
ciation of the role of oil in the plot that led Bolivia and Paraguay to face each other in the
battlefields of the inhospitable Chaco:
Likewise, one should also consider the interests of the international oil companies that
operated in the disputed area (Standard Oil and Royal Dutch-Shell), which would have
promoted the armed conflict in an attempt to acquire a territory supposedly rich in oil, as
suggested among others by Sergio Almaraz, Julio J. Chiavenato, Arturo Frondizi1 or
Alfredo Seiferheld. This position, recurrent in the tradition of the anti-imperialist left, has
been challenged in recent works such as Stephen Cote’s, who, while considering oil as a key
factor in the outbreak of the Chaco War, does not focus his analysis on foreign interests but
on the growing need on the part of Bolivia to increase its oil production to supply urban
consumption and the mining industry and, at the same time, find a fluvial outlet to export the
surplus through the Paraguay River until the Atlantic ocean. (Zuccarino, 2017, relying on
the following works: Almaraz, 1958; Chiavenato, 2007; Frondizi, 1954; Seiferheld, 1983;
Cote, 2016; and see also Zavaleta Mercado, 1967: 79)
Historical research has thus questioned the factual basis beneath the thesis of the
“War of the Standard Oil.” It calls to reason that we disentangle how nonetheless the
conspiracy theory reached such a wide reception in Latin America. What were
the factual evidence and discursive mechanisms that sustained that narrative? How were
factually unconnected events interwoven into a conspiratorial worldview claiming to
have disclosed how the belligerent countries had been played out by imperialist forces
and interests?
Did the Standard Oil Finance the Bolivian Army?
The conspiracy narrative of the “War of the Standard Oil” gained credibility as it seemed
backed by Bolivia’s huge contractual concessions to that company and the lack of an
official agreement on the part of Paraguay and Argentina to allow Bolivian oil to exit
through the Paraguay River. In addition, as an additional factual basis, those sustaining
the conspiracy theory argued that Bolivian soldiers were transported from the Altiplano
to the battlefield in Standard Oil trucks (Mariaca Bilbao, 1966: 43–65).
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Such “factual” information could be easily challenged when considering that the
Bolivian government maintained a conflictual relationship with Standard Oil for years,
because the company did not produce at the levels it was supposed to, according to the
terms of the territorial concession, and even resisted paying taxes as demanded. In
addition, Salamanca’s government confiscated the trucks of the North American com-
pany, for their use in the transportation of soldiers from the Altiplano (Klein, 1969, esp.
194–197 and 217–218).
The narrative that Bolivia had been coerced or persuaded by the Standard Oil Co. into
entering the war concealed the lack of cooperation and the tensions that prevailed
between the Bolivian government and Standard Oil. Already in 1970, in a book on the
policy of the peace conference on Chaco, based on archival documentation and sec-
ondary sources, researcher Leslie B. Rout Jr. had clearly indicated the series of factors
that led to the unsolvable relations between Bolivia and the Company (Rout Jr., 1970). In
the first place, the fact that Bolivia had granted vast monopolistic land concessions to
Standard Oil aiming at making a huge profit by enlarging revenues for the public
treasury; yet, until 1927, the oil company had concentrated oil production in only four
wells (Bermejo, Sanandita, Camiri and Catamindi), out of which it produced only a small
volume, given the lack of a clear outlet to the petroleum markets. In addition, between
1919 and 1928, Standard Oil conducted a legal battle against the Argentine province
[state] of Salta over oil concessions, which generated in Argentina a wave of nationalist
reactions, leading in 1922 to the creation of Yacimientos Petrolı́feros Fiscales, the
national Argentine oil company, with Standard Oil moving part of its operations to
Bolivia (Bunge, 1933: 72–93). In 1925, the Argentine government denied a request from
Standard Oil to build an oil pipeline from Bolivia to a deepwater port on the Paraná River
through which it could export oil, while in 1927 it raised the tax rates on Bolivian oil at
exorbitant rates. Moreover, the popular belief that by taking possession of Chaco, the
company would gain access to a deepwater port allowing the navigation of cargo ships
did not have any real support, due to the nature of the fluvial basin and routes. In
addition, the idea of transporting oil in small boats was equally unrealistic in practical
terms. This, in turn, explains the decision of Standard Oil to reduce oil production in
Bolivia to levels of domestic demand, withholding concessions, even if it contradicted
the expectations of the Bolivian authorities.
Such confluence of factors undermined friendly relations between the Bolivian state
and Standard Oil. It reached the point that in 1928, on learning that the company had
covertly moved oil to Argentina in 1925, President Hernán Siles demanded the payment
of taxes for undeclared profits, giving Standard Oil a deadline of 1 January 1930 to
deliver the payments, a decision the company challenged in Bolivian courts. In addition,
in 1928, Bolivian army officers had taken possession of Standard Oil trucks without
compensation. Siles’ successor, Daniel Salamanca – already immersed in the war – tried
to overcome the company’s policy of not producing oil in accordance with its maximum
capacity by nationalizing the refineries until the cessation of hostilities (Rout Jr., 1970:
45–48).
After the war, in March 1937, the government of President Toro cancelled the con-
cessions and seized possession of the company, nationalizing it without any
Roniger and Senkman 13
compensation, claiming that in 1925–1927 Standard Oil had secretly produced more oil
than it declared and had exported it through private oil pipelines to Argentina (Muñoz
Reyes, 1937, in Klein, 1969: 260–264). In other words, the relations between Bolivia and
the oil company were already tense before the armed conflict, making it unlikely that
there was a joint secret plan for the capture of the eastern part of El Chaco, whereby no
oil deposits would be found. Nonetheless, this feeble factual support did not deter the
formation of the conspiracy theory and its attributed credibility in political and intel-
lectual circles in Bolivia and throughout Latin America.
Decoding the Transnational Diffusion of a Conspiracy Thread
According to different analysts, in 1932, the Argentine and Paraguayan press – probably
starting with the Argentine anti-imperialist publisher “Claridad” – argued that Standard
Oil was financing the Bolivian aggressor and supplied the needs of that invading army in
Chaco, so to gain territory for a pipeline to the Paraguay River (Chesterton, 2013; Mora
and Cooney, 2007: 78).
Nationalists energised by the dispute between the Standard Oil Company and the
province of Salta advanced these accusations and narrative in the Argentine press. Added
to it, the conspiracy narrative served to convince Paraguayans that the hostilities had
opened at the initiative of Bolivia, supported by the capitalist interests of Standard Oil
and the apparatus of the United States. In that context, they argued, Paraguay had entered
the war with the sole desire to defend its national territory.
On 26 January 1933, Standard Oil denied such accusations in the pages of The New
York Times, declaring its neutrality in the conflict between Bolivia and Paraguay. The
newspaper also reported that the company would initiate a legal suit against Bolivia for
confiscating its automotive park and cargo animals, again highlighting the tensions and
lack of cooperation between the oil company and Bolivia at war (Cote, 2013: 748; Mora
and Cooney, 2007: 64).
In a second phase, US Senator Huey Long, who was preparing to launch his presi-
dential campaign in 1936, echoed the conspiratorial argument. Long, a populist, used the
conspiracy theory to attack Standard Oil, an emblematic capitalist corporation with
which he had fought and been attacked by as governor of Louisiana (1928–1932). A few
years later, when Long had been elected to the US Senate, he found the argument
beneficial in denouncing the alleged dark manoeuvres of the Standard Oil Co. On 30
May 1934, Senator Long delivered an energetic speech denouncing Standard Oil for
provoking the Chaco War and financing the Bolivian army to seize the Paraguayan
Chaco, rich in oil, which would enable launching an oil pipeline from Bolivia to the
Paraguay River (Cardozo, 1965: 136; Mora and Cooney, 2007: 79-81).
Given the political prominence of Long and the ongoing concern with policies of
discretionary or impartial arms embargos to both countries, discussed for years by the
three branches of US government (American Foreign Relations, 2018; Supreme Court,
1936), the press immediately registered the conspiracy argument. The US press pro-
jected it to national public opinion, from where it was refracted and gained credence in
Paraguay. Even those who, like journalist Juan Stefanich, the future chancellor of
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Paraguay, clearly attributed the war to “belligerent dreams, the cult of force, the chimera
of Bolivia’s military potential,”2 at the same time, echoed Long’s assertions about the
interference of Standard Oil (Stefanich, 1934: 21–22, 28–29, 100, 113).
Once the Bolivian advance of military forces stalled and there were sharp defeats with
around 65,000 soldiers fallen, captured, or deserting the ranks, in addition to tens of
thousands of wounded, the conspiracy argument spread widely in Bolivia as well. In
Bolivia, the claim was used by those who wanted to attack “reckless President Sal-
amanca,” the oligarchy allied to Standard Oil, and the high military command respon-
sible for the defeat and a likely loss of national territory (Klein, 1969: 187).
Serving in the US Senate, Long continued to have great power and influence in
Louisiana, where he developed different projects. When Judge Henry Pavy opposed
some of his initiatives for legal reasons, Long tried to dismiss him. Pavy’s son-in-law, a
physician by the name of Carl Weiss, went to the Louisiana state legislature building in
Baton Rouge in September 1935 during a visit by Long allegedly to ask him to recon-
sider the decision. When rejected by Long and his bodyguards, he opened fire, killing
Long just days after he had announced his decision to run for the US presidency.3 Long’s
bodyguards then killed Weiss. For many in Latin America, however, Long’s death had
been clearly orchestrated by the American oil company. According to Scalabrini Ortiz,
Long’s “passionate attack on Standard Oil, for his intervention in the Chaco war, cost
him his life,” when he was “killed a few weeks after voicing his complaint” (Scalabrini
Ortiz, 1938: 8, and 2001 [1940]: 155–156).
In Latin America, Long’s assassination reaffirmed the narrative according to which
Standard Oil and Shell, motivated by their competitive desires for the Chaco’s oil
deposits, had coerced the two landlocked countries of South America to go into war. The
theory convinced many in the region, even though geologically, the central Chaco had no
oil reserve indicators and oil does not exist in that area (Cote, 2013). Even Spruille
Braden, the American businessman who had strong interests in Standard Oil and would
be sent by the Department of State to the Seventh Inter-American Conference of
American States in Montevideo in 1933, doubted that there were important oil reserves
in the disputed Chaco region (Braden, 1971: 25–27). Moreover, even those who
attributed the War to the conspiracy of oil interests and the rivalry between the American
oil company and the Anglo-Dutch oil company recognised that Standard Oil dominated
the Bolivian deposits “with the purpose of keeping them as part of its world reserves.”
For that reason, it developed more the work of exploration and drilling of wells than
production, “as it lacked the intention of exploiting them until an eventuality arose that
could prevent the supply of the Latin American and European markets from their
ordinary sources of production” (Almaraz, 1958: 97–98).
The Epilogue of the War and Regional Geopolitical Interests
The outbreak of the war originated in unresolved border disputes between the belligerent
countries, projecting all the weight of historical trauma and the dreams of renewed
national grandeur into policymaking decisions. During the war and especially after the
cessation of hostilities, however, regional powers and the United States exerted great
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pressure on the weakened parties according to their own geopolitical interests. Among
others, Argentina worked diplomatically against Bolivia, and Brazil against Paraguay,
both fed by geopolitical considerations and vested economic interests (landowning and
fluvial transportation by Argentines in Paraguay), while still prevailing false ideas of
access to the – non-existent – oil reserves in the subequatorial Chaco. The Chaco war had
exacerbated conspiracy theories in Brazil against Argentina, its historical rival and
potential enemy supposedly allied to Paraguay and the Royal Dutch Shell, fearing during
the war a victorious advance of the Paraguayan army with Argentine support. From the
Brazilian perspective, the most salient threat was the possibility that the Paraguayan
army could achieve the old secessionist project of separating Santa Cruz de la Sierra
from Bolivia, thus leaving the Amazon valley open to “Argentine infiltration.” In
addition, Itamaraty feared that the Guaranı́ troops, when descending by the Mamoré
river, would seize the region of Cochabamba, where – it was fantasised – there were also
oil reserves (Barrero, 1979: 285; Moniz Bandeira, 1998, note 160). Unsurprisingly, at the
peace negotiations, Brazil sided with Bolivia, while the latter became increasingly aware
of the weight of Argentina in the negotiations (Escudé, 1992: 246–247). On 21 July
1938, Paraguay and Bolivia signed a definitive peace treaty of “Peace, Friendship and
Boundaries” in Buenos Aires. Paraguay did not retain all the territory that its armies had
occupied. It did not manage to set the border on the banks of the Parapitı́ River, as was its
maximalist aspiration, but there is no doubt that it retained most of the territory in
dispute, also reaffirming its sovereignty over Bahia Negra on the Paraguay River. As for
Bolivia, achieving a free port over the Paraguay River and possession of the entire
Parapitı́ river basin did not conceal the enormous territorial loss suffered. A new frus-
tration was beating heavily over the nation of the Highlands (Hernández, 2017) that
would prompt radical political changes in the following decades.
During the Second World War, other conspiracy theories and discourses emerged in
South America. They would suggest that the MNR mass movement was supposedly an
instrument of a global Fascist and Nazi plan, led by Paz Estenssoro and Siles Suazo, its
leaders. Likewise, they denounced the threat that the arrival of Jewish refugees escaping
from Nazi barbarism represented for Bolivia (Siles Suazo, 1942). In countries that
increasingly grew suspicious of external interference and conspiracy plots, additional
subsidiary conspiratorial discourses emerged in the context ideological polarization
between the pro-Allies, anti-fascist fronts, and the Nazi-Fascist Axis, before and during
World War II. Both in Bolivia and in Argentina, many started believing that the leaders
of the Bolivian MNR were part of a Fascist and pro-Nazi plan, attuned to the GOU and
Colonel Juan Domingo Perón, accusing them of being an instrument of a global plan
pervading the Americas (Figallo, 1996; Zanatta, 2006, Zuccarino and Vilar, 2013).
Conspiracy narratives changed focus after the war yet continued to prevail as a major
way of interpreting world developments for many in Latin America.
Conclusions
Conspiratorial narratives reflect a mode of analysis, a logic of interpreting and thinking
reality in terms of subterranean threats and malevolent plots, the product of secret
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nefarious deceit. They suggest an epistemic worldview that conditions and interprets the
world as the object of sinister machinations. Following Geoffrey Cubitt (1993), historian
Ernesto Bohoslavsky characterised such an episteme as “the propensity to consider that
politics is dominated by malicious and secret machinations of a group with interests and
values opposed to those of the bulk of society.” Such a perspective considers that
the true meaning of things hides behind appearances and that the relevance of politics
actually takes place behind the scenes. In the logic of the plot, there is no place for chance
and involuntary results, but the facts are always presented as the desired consequence of a
secret intentionality. (Bohoslavsky, 2009: 17)
It is then rational for those who think and imagine reality in such a manner to be
impelled to unmask, expose, and punish those who “in the darkness” planned to affect
the integrity of a nation, a society, or the whole of humanity. The Chaco War highlights
the likelihood of a more general trend that in twentieth-century Latin America conspi-
racy theories tilted analysis towards the disclosure of suspected schemes by British and
Yankee imperialism. Such a view was conditioned by the very real impact of interna-
tional forces in hemispheric affairs during the twentieth century, foremost the increas-
ingly hegemonic role played by the United States and its policies aimed at controlling
access to resources deemed strategic by the US’s investments in the Americas. US pre-
eminence was reflected beginning with the results of the Spanish-American war of 1898.
It continued with Panama’s independence; the “gunboat and dollar diplomacy” and
invasions in Central America and the Caribbean in the late 1910s, 1920s, and early
1930 s; the alignment of most Latin American elites and armed forces with the United
States in the late 1930s and 1940s; the multi-lateral and bilateral military cooperation
since the 1940s; and the 1954 intervention in Guatemala. Following the strong reaction
to the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the gates opened for counterinsurgency support fight-
ing the guerrilla and revolutionary movements in many South and Central American
countries and US-inspired military coups in countries such as Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile
(Roniger, 2010; Smith, 2000). As historian Felipe Fernández-Armesto put it colourfully,
by the early twentieth century and for many decades, “United States would not tolerate in
the Americas any imperialism but its own” (2003: 165).
Still, US administrations had shifting policies in the Americas, something that often
has been glossed over by Latin Americans denouncing exclusively US imperialism.
Likewise, the agency of domestic political actors should not be underestimated, as
clearly shown in the tensions between Latin American right-wing and military gov-
ernments on the one hand, and on the other, the US administrations during the 1970s and
1980s. Ignoring such nuances, in the context of the Cold War, the hegemonic role of the
United States in the Americas generated polarised alignments, with intellectuals ela-
borating cultural visions defying the hegemon, among them dependency theory (Cueva,
1976; Sáenz Carrete, 2014) and theories on the “development of underdevelopment”
(Bambirra, 1974; Dos Santos, 1972, Galeano, 1971; Gunder Frank, 1970), which sus-
tained countervailing political projects of decolonization and solidarity among Third
World nations affected by corporate capitalism and hegemonic Western powers. Such
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cultural confrontation was central to shaping the political perceptions of Latin America
during the Cold War years, as increasingly recognised in contemporary historiography
(Bloch and Rodrı́guez, 2014; Calandra and Franco, 2012).
Against such background, for many Latin Americans theorizing the geopolitical
marginality of their nations it was thus only natural to embrace conspiracy theories of
covert imperialist strategies of domination even when, as in the case of the Chaco War,
geopolitics and regional disputes had operated in ways that were more complex. Equally
worth of attention is the transnational path of reception of such conspiracy theories, as
analysed in this article. What is certainly ironic, and perhaps tragic, is that many Latin
Americans enmeshed in the confrontational logics of the Cold War period aggrandised
their attribution of United States and United Kingdom might to the point of depleting and
sidelining their own political agency. They turned themselves into just victims of external
political and economic forces, exempt from any responsibility in the regional war, thus
flattening historical complexities into narratives driven by the idea of a covert conspiracy.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the constructive comments and suggestions of the anonymous
readers of a first version of this article and the participants of the departmental colloquium of
Politics and International Affairs at Wake Forest University where a revised version was presented
in November 2018. Alex Estrada is recognised for his superb editorial assistance.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,
and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.
Notes
1. Soon-to-be Argentine president Arturo Frondizi’s assessment that oil interests were behind the
belligerent countries is still used today in the educational texts of Bolivia as proof of the
veracity of the revealed conspiracy leading to the war. In the Semanario Educativo – Bandera
de Bolivia we read the following paragraph: “The war was supported from abroad by oil multi-
nationals that were disputing the exploitation of the deposits and their fluvial way out.” In 1956
[two years before becoming Argentine president], Arturo Frondizi said: “In the front line are the
republics of Bolivia and Paraguay, but behind them are: behind the former, the Standard Oil of
New Jersey; and behind the latter, the general economic interests of the Anglo-Argentine
capital invested in the Chaco and the special interests of the Royal Dutch-Shell.” (http://
www.educabolivia.bo/files/textos/TX_Guerra_del_Chaco.pdf). See also Chiavenato 1979,
2007.
2. Stefanich (1934) argued that Bolivia had launched its aggression in the Chaco, “from a geo-
graphy [sic] foreign to its history,” in its eagerness to overcome internal problems and – citing
Sucre’s newspaper La Prensa – “to merge the spirit of a true national union in the battlefields.”
3. Such official claim was disputed by those suggesting that Dr. Weiss had been also a victim in a
wider conspiracy plot by “powers to be,” whose identity remains a controversial issue to this
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day. See, for example, http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2010/09/controversy_mystery_
still_surr.html
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